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A LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND MANDATORY COMMITMENT*
FREDERICK LYNCH was charged with violating the District of Columbia
bad check law which carries with it a maximum prison sentence of twelve
months.' Lynch, however, has been under restraint for more than seventeen
months as a result of this charge, although he was not found guilty.2 More
precisely, he was found not guilty by reason of insanity-a "defense" which
was raised by the prosecutor over Lynch's objection.3 Pursuant to statute,
he was automatically committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital until found free
*Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 29 U.S.L. WEEK
3382 (U.S. June 20, 1961).
1. D.C. CODE § 22-1410 (1951).
It is by no means certain that Lynch would have received the maximum sentence; rather,
... it seems likely that, had the plea [of guilty] been accepted, in the light of the fact that
the defendant had no previous record, he would have been placed on probation or given a
suspended sentence." Speiser, Statement before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
in Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill in Criminal Cases of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (May 2, 1961) (unpublished, on file in
Yale Law Library).
2. Lynch was found not guilty by reason of insanity of violating the District of Columbia
bad check law before the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia in December, 1959.
Pursuant to D.C. CODE § 24-301(d) (Supp. VIII, 1960) he was committed to St. Elizabeths
Hospital. No appeal was taken. On June 13, 1960, Lynch petitioned the District Court for
the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court on June 27, 1960,
ordered Lynch released, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed on January 26, 1961. In the interim Lynch had been conditionally released from St.
Elizabeths pursuant to D.C. CODE § 24-301(e). A conditional release from a mental hospital
is similar to a parole from prison, and "it cannot be doubted that the prisoner on parole is cer-
tainly subject to some personal restraints of liberty not ordinarily imposed on free citizens
... he has circumscribed his freedom of choice and action-of going when and where he
pleases." Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586, 589-90, 15 So. 2d 293, 295 (1943). The Court of Ap-
peals was convinced that Lynch was "well on his way to unconditional release, without the
probability of repeat offenses," Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Subsequently, however, "Mr. Lynch, who had been conditionally released by the hospital,
entered upon a course of conduct spread across the continent to California and back, which
resulted in a request from Dr. Overholser that steps be taken to revoke his conditional
release status." Gasch, Statement before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in
Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill in Crimninal Cases of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (May 2, 1961) (unpublished, on file in
Yale Law Library).
3. Neither the Municipal nor District Court opinions were reported. The relevant
history is taken from the Court of Appeals opinion, Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388,
389-90, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961). While the Municipal Court had precedent for its action
in allowing the prosecutor to raise the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, United
States v. Kloman, Criminal No. 383-58, D.D.C., February 15, 1960, such action has been
severely criticized. See Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia A
Legal Lorelei, 49 GEo. L.J. 294, 316-20 (1960); Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial
Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905,
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of such "abnormal mental conditions as would make him dangerous to the
community."4 Because the insanity defense was introduced despite Lynch's
repeated objections, the resulting mandatory commitment cannot be justified
on the ground that by voluntarily raising the defense of insanity the defendant
'acknowledges the right of the state" to confine him for psychiatric treatment.
Thus Lynch is the first reported case of a mandatory commitment which was,
in every sense, "involuntary." Although the Supreme Court 6 may decide
Lynch on procedural grounds by holding that only the defendant may raise the
defense of insanity, the case-by exposing the full implications of the manda-
tory commitment statute-also invites examination of the broader questions
of whether a defendant, found not guilty by reason of insanity, may con-
stitutionally be committed to a mental hospital without any further proceedings
and, if so, whether and under what conditions such commitment may con-
stitutionally be continued beyond the period of the sentence which would have
resulted from a verdict of guilty. Frederick Lynch's confinement was not
restricted to a period measured by a criminal sentence because "by its
very nature, hospitalization, to be effective, must be initially [sic] for an
indeterminate period" and since "hospitalization is remedial" whereas "a
jail sentence is punitive," "further consideration of the criminal penalty
. . . becomes irrelevant, for any and all purposes."' 7 Hospitalization and im-
prisonment, in other words, are assumed by the court to be mutually exclusive
sanctions, and it is further assumed that the criminal process can effectively
separate those who should be punished for their illegal acts by imprisonment
from those who should be treated by hospitalization. In order to analyze the
validity of these assumptions, the concept of criminal responsibility and its
relationship to involuntary confinement must be reexamined.
938-40 (1961). Furthermore, in an earlier case which was not cited by either the majority or
the dissent in Lynch, the Supreme Court of Colorado had held that the "defendant had an
absolute right to be tried on the plea of not guilty." Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289, 294,
116 P.2d 193, 195 (1941). See also REPORT OF ROYAL CoMMIssIoN ON CAPIT. PUNIsH-
2\!ENT §§ 442-44 (1953). For a discussion of some of the policy issues involved, see Samuels,
Cat the Prosecution Allege that the Accused is Insane?, [1960] CRim. L. REv. (ENG.) 435.
4. Although the mandatory commitment statute provides for release upon a finding
"(1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in the opinion of the superin-
tendent, such person will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others,
and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional
release. . . .", D.C. CODE § 24-301(e), the D.C. Court of Appeals has interpreted this as
requiring that "[there must be freedom from abnormal mental condition as would make
the individual dangerous to himself or the community in the reasonably foreseeable future."
Order, Overholser v. Leach, No. 14480, D.C. Cir., Sept. 18, 1958; see generally, Krash,
The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of
Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 944 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations
on) the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 230
(1960).
6. Cert. granted, Overholser v. Lynch, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3382 (June 20, 1961).
7. Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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The criminal law accepts, as a basic premise, the moral judgment that
punishment may result only from a freely willed illegal act. But proponents
of total determinism have for centuries denied the possibility that any act may
be freely willed.8 The criminal law, however, by imposing punishment on at
least some acts, has indicated its rejection of the posit of total determinism
in favor of the posit of free will,9 and since the law-the manifestation of
societies' collective moral judgments-is based essentially on the collective
beliefs of society, the criminal law cannot meaningfully be subjected to
criticism on the ground that its underlying beliefs are contradicted by some
all pervasive but unknown truth (i.e. that ultimately all acts are wholly deter-
mined). Consequently, society must postulate (i.e. believe) that a given act
might not have occurred before the criminal law could meaningfully designate
such an act as having been freely chosen. If, on the other hand, society postu-
lated that the illegal act must have occurred, it would be meaningless for the
criminal law to designate such an act as having been willfully chosen even
if the individual regarded himself as a free agent. But even where it is postu-
lated that an illegal act might not have occurred, it is still possible for society
to postulate the existence of a mathematical probability that such act would
occur.10 And such a postulated probability must be taken as imposing limits on
the capacity freely to choose a given act-limits which tend to eliminate free
choice as the probability increases. Unless society is willing to hold a person
criminally responsible for an illegal act even though his capacity for free
choice is severely limited, it must establish an arbitrary maximum probability
above which criminal responsibility will not attach. Criminal responsibility,
then, is a conclusory term describing a maximum probability above which
the correlation between defendant's relevant psychiatric characteristics and the
illegal act is so great that "punishment" ought not result. The discussion which
follows will examine the function of involuntary confinement in the light of
this concept of criminal responsibility. In order to simplify this examination
three increasingly complex models of society will be constructed. It is assumed
that the society of model III has postulated the validity of a variety of beliefs
but has also postulated the unverifiabiity of such beliefs. In order to assess the
function of involuntary confinement in light of these postulates, models I and II
8. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRiNcIPLEs oF CRimNAL LAW 526-33 (1st ed. 1947).
9. See People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 724 n.4, 336 P.2d 492, 496-97 n.4 (1959).
10. In other words, even if society did not believe (postulate) that an act was determined
by prior factors, it might nevertheless believe that prior factors created, within an individual,
a kind of a priori probability that the act would occur in the same way that there is an a
priori probability of 1 in 52 that the ace of spades can be cut from a bridge deck, or of 35
in 36 that "box cars" (two sixes) will not come up on a pair of dice. Instead of chaos,
therefore, the alternate to determinism would be conceived of as an orderly randomness,
similar to that in many electronic computers which incorporate "random elements," i.e.
elements which in the long run, like a flipped coin, select equally betveen two possibilities.
Such random elements eliminate the possibility that the computer will be unable to "make
up its mind" when two: answers are equally indicated. For an application of this principle
see note 13 infra.
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will be constructed. In these models it shall be assumed that the postulated
beliefs of model III are, in fact, true, and additionally it shall be assumed
that all the factors relevant to such beliefs are fully knowable. In all three
societies a constitutional concept of due process is assumed.
MODEL SocIEY I
In the first model society it shall be assumed that:
1) For purposes of the criminal law, "mental disease" exists when illegal
behavior is totally determined by relevant psychiatric characteristics.
2) Any given act is either wholly determined or wholly undetermined.
3) All relevant psychiatric characteristics and the specific acts they portend are
ascertainable.
4) Psychiatrists can cure some-but not all-mentally diseased persons.
5) Although treatment may require an extensive period of time, the change in
characteristics will be instantaneous when it occurs and will be designated as
cure.
6) Psychiatrists can differentiate between those having curable and incurable
mental disease.
7) Psychiatrists can predict with certainty the amount of time required to
accomplish cure.
8) Without psychiatric treatment, no mental disease can be cured.
9) All cure is permanent; no propensity to relapse exists.
10) Ample psychiatric facilities are available in hospitals; no such facilities
are available in prisons.
Given a person with curable mental disease who has committed an illegal
act, the salutary effect of psychiatric treatment in model I is evident. Were
such a person imprisoned rather than hospitalized, he would serve his sentence
without being cured; consequently, he would still be diseased when released,
and he would therefore recommit the act. Although some deterrent effect
might have been achieved by imprisonment,'- society would have failed either
to effect the cure or to prevent the second crime. Hospitalization, on the other
hand, would fulfill the functions both of cure and isolation since, by hypothesis,
the accused suffers from curable mental disease and will not, when cured,
recommit the act. If, on the other hand, the person who has committed the
11. There is a possibility that imprisoning a defendant suffering from a mental disease
will be an inefficient deterrent to others.
[Dieterrent examples [must] appear sufficiently similar to those to be deterred to
elicit the degree of identification necessary for the conclusion that what happened
to the deterrent examples might well happen to the observers, should they violate
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illegal act has an incurable mental disease, then, although confinement will ful-
fill the goal of isolation, cure will not be possible. In such cases, society may be
willing, where repetitions of the illegal act involved are not intolerable, to
compromise its interest in isolating the mentally diseased person with the
individual's interest in his own liberty. Confinement of the person for an
arbitrary period determined by the harmfulness of the act involved might
effect such a compromise.
Furthermore, a psychiatrist in the model society could accurately know not
only whether a mentally diseased person would recommit an illegal act, but
also whether a mentally diseased person, whose past behavior had not included
such acts, would in the future violate the law. If applied to all persons who
would be certain to commit or recommit illegal acts, civil commitment 2 in
the model society could be used to fulfill the societal goals of isolation and,
in some cases, cure. If mental disease is curable, moreover, the model society
might regard as irrelevant the fact that the period required for cure was longer
than the sentence which a court might have imposed. Even in this society,
however, in cases where repetitions of the illegal act are not considered in-
tolerable, and where cure requires extended treatment, limiting confinement
to the period of a reasonable sentence might accomplish a compromise similar
to that indicated in cases of incurable disease.
Model I postulates that certain acts are not determined. Such acts are
defined as freely chosen and, if they involve all the other elements of a crime,
the persons committing them would be considered criminally responsible.
Should society believe that "free agents" are less apt to "choose" to do a
criminal act if such act is accompanied by the certainty of punishment, then
a prison term (or any other punishment) might reasonably be imposed upon
a free agent who has been convicted of a crime. Imprisonment would thereby
serve the functions of rehabilitation, isolation and deterrence.
MODEL SOCIETY II
The second model society varies from model I in that:
1) For purposes of the criminal law, "mental disease" exists when illegal
behavior is correlated with relevant psychiatric characteristics (i.e., totally
determined or made mathematically probable by the existence of such charac-
teristics).
2) Any given act may be partially determined and partially attributable to the
exercise of free choice.
3) Psychiatric treatment may eventuate in the gradual change of relevant
psychiatric characteristics, and a corresponding decrease in the probability of
an act's occurrence; such a change will be designated as a partial cure.
4) Assumptions 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 regarding model I are also made for
model II and are repeated here for convenience:
12. See note 14 infra.
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3) All relevant psychiatric characteristics and the specific acts they portend
are ascertainable.
4) Psychiatrists can cure some-but not all-mentally diseased persons.
6) Psychiatrists can differentiate between those having curable and incurable
mental disease.
7) Psychiatrists can predict with certainty the amount of time required to
accomplish cure.
8) Without psychiatric treatment, no mental disease can be cured.
9) All cure is permanent; no propensity to relapse exists.
10) Ample psychiatric facilities are available in hospitals; no such facilities
are available in prisons.
In model II a balance would have to be struck between the desirability of
imprisonment to counteract the propensity freely to choose to recommit illegal
acts, and the desirability of psychiatric treatment to alter characteristics so
as to lower this correlation. Due process, in such a society would make it
necessary to establish a minimum probability that the relevant characteristics
would result in the commission of an illegal act; below this probability a
person would be regarded as criminally responsible for his acts and therefore
subject to imprisonment, and above this probability hospitalization would be
permitted only after some sort of civil commitment proceeding. 13 Civil com-
mitment in this model would be based on the presence of a sufficiently high
probability of illegal behavior to warrant hospitalization. But civil commitment
need not be based on the same probability as criminal responsibility; it might
require a higher probability. In that case a criminal defendant whose relevant
psychiatric characteristics involve a probability too high to justify a finding
of criminal responsibility but too low to justify civil commitment would be
immune from confinement. But a society concerned with the safety of its
inhabitants would probably eliminate this possibility by invoking civil com-
mitment procedures for any correlation higher than that required for a finding
of criminal responsibility, or by raising the correlation required for a finding
of criminal responsibility to the level required for civil commitment.
Another difficult problem facing the society of model II is presented by the
following case: a person commits an illegal act; although the act was to a sub-
stantial degree correlated with his relevant characteristics, he was held crimin-
ally responsible because the correlation was not high enough for exculpation;
his relevant characteristics can be altered to reduce the correlation still further
by psychiatric treatment. The choice between hospitalization and imprisonment
in such a case must reflect a balancing of numerous factors including the
13. Civil commitment proceedings are defined as any form of hearing by which a
mentally diseased person may be hospitalized solely on the basis of the fact that,
and only as long as, the correlation betveen his relevant psychiatric characteristics and
the future commission of an illegal or sufficiently dangerous act is above a stated migimum.
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extent to which imprisonment would lower the propensity of the actor and
others freely to choose to recommit illegal acts, the extent to which psychiatric
treatment can change mental characteristics to result in a lower correlation
with illegal behavior, and the amount of time required by either imprisonment
or hospitalization to accomplish these goals. Furthermore, although psychiatry
might be able accurately to ascertain the correlations between mental charac-
teristics and illegal acts, and the time required to lower these correlations to
any given point, it nevertheless seems unlikely that precise determinations
could be made of the extent to which imprisonment counteracted the postulated
propensity to recommit illegal acts. Society might, however, assign an
arbitrary weight to the rehabilitative effect of a given period of imprisonment.
An individual's overall propensity to commit an illegal act could thus be ascer-
tained by adding this arbitrary figure to the known correlation between his
relevant characteristics and the illegal act. In this way, minimum overall
propensities necessary for release could be determined, albeit with a residual
element of arbitrariness.1 4
14. The argument may be better understood by imagining a world in which each
person is given a number of boxes each containing one hundred balls, some black and some
white. Whenever the opportunity to do a particular act is presented, a person must reach
blindly into the proper box and select a ball. If the ball selected is black, the act must
be done; if the ball is white, the person is free to do or not to do the act, as he chooses.
The correlation between relevant psychiatric characteristics and a particular illegal act,
referred to in this Note, is represented by the number of black balls in the corresponding
box. A correlation of 60 would mean that a particular box for a given act contained 60
black and 40 white balls. If every time a person having a correlation of 60 selected a white
ball he freely chose not to commit the particular act, he would do that act 60 per cent of
all times the opportunity to do it was presented (the times it was compelled by the selection
of a black ball). If the same person freely chose to do the act each time he selected a white
ball that act would be done 100 per cent of the times it was possible (the 60 per cent of the
time it was compelled plus the 40 per cent of the time it was freely chosen). Assume
psychiatric treatment is able to change black balls into white balls, and that imprisonment
may influence the exercise of free choice against the commission of the act. Assume
additionally that person A initially chooses not to commit a particular illegal act whenever
he selects a white ball. Both his correlation (black balls) and his overall propensity to
commit the illegal act (black balls plus white balls whose selection resulted in the com-
mission of the act) are 60. One day A selects a black ball and commits the illegal act. One
month later, realizing that no one has discovered his illegal act, it occurs to him that he
may be able to repeat the act without incurring a criminal sanction. This may result in
his decision freely to choose to do the act 25 per cent of the times a white ball is selected
(10 times out of every 40 free choices). If so his overall propensity to recommit the illegal
act would become 70 (60 black balls plus 10 white balls) ; his correlation, however, would
remain at 60. Assume that A is now apprehended and imprisoned for one year. This
may cause him to reconsider the advisability of recommitting the act: he may now decide
freely to choose the act only 10 per cent of the times a white ball is selected (4 times out
of 40) ; his overall propensity would now be 64 (60 plul 4). If, during that year, he was
committed to a hospital for psychiatric treatment, half the black balls might be changed to
white; moreover the involuntary hospital confinement for one year might cause him to
reconsider the advisability of recommitting the act: he may now also decide freely to




A third model may now be assumed. The society of this model postulates that:
a. For purposes of the criminal law, "mental disease" exists when illegal
behavior is correlated with relevant psychiatric characteristics (i.e. totally
the act 7 times out of 70 (free opportunities; his overall propensity would therefore be
37 (30+7).
A quick partial cure might not lower his overall propensity. If a partial cure could be
accomplished in one day (10 black balls changed to white) but if his initial decision freely
to choose the act in 25 per cent of free opportunities rose to 40 per cent, because the illegal
act was not severely enough punished, his overall propensity would remain at 70 (50 plus
40 per cent of 50) despite his one day cure.
A quick complete cure, however, might lower the overall propensity to a point sufficient
to warrant release, since, even if release after one day tended to increase the inclination
freely to choose the illegal act to 40 per cent, the overall propensity would nevertheless
fall to 40 (0+40). Assuming that society decided to predicate release on the reduction of
the overall propensity to below 50, it might reasonably refuse to release a person prior to
the expiration of a reasonable sentence because his correlation had fallen below 50, but
rather it might insist on the accomplishment of an almost complete cure as a prerequisite
to such a premature release in order to counteract the anticipated but unpredictable effect
of such a release on the inclination of such a person freely to choose the illegal act.
The following table summarizes this example:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Per Cent of
Times Act Number of Times Overall
Freely Chosen Act freely Chosen propen-
Total Number of (when white (when white ball sity
Time i; A's Correlations Free Choices ball is is selected) (CoL 2 +
case history (Black Balls) (White Balls) selected) (Col. 3 x Col. 4) col. 5)









After one year 60 40 10% 4 64
of imprisonment
After one year 30 70 10% 7 37*
of hospitaliza-
tion
After a one day 50 50 40% 20 70
partial cure in
hospital
After a one day 0 100 40% 40 40*
total cure in
hospital
*Can be released since overall propensity is less than 50.
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determined or made mathematically probable by the existence of such charac-
teristics).
b. Any given act may be partially determined and partially attributable to
the exercise of free choice.
c. Psychiatrists can completely or partially cure (i.e. eliminate the cor-
relation between relevant psychiatric characteristics and illegal acts) some,
but not all mentally diseased persons.
d. Without psychiatric treatment no mental disease can be cured.
e. All cure is permanent; no propensity to relapse exists.
f. The fear of imprisonment deters "free agents" from choosing to commit
an illegal act.
g. Not all relevant psychiatric characteristics are knowable.
h. Available empirical data appears to support these postulates; but the
postulates cannot be absolutely verified.
The society of model III, like the society of model II, might recognize the
undesirability of permitting some persons to be immune from confinement
because the correlation between their relevant characteristics and their illegal
acts was too high to warrant a finding of criminal responsibility but not high
enough to justify civil commitment. In order to minimize this possibility,
society III might attempt to make the correlation necessary for criminal
exculpability the same as that which justifies civil commitment. But, given the
postulated absence of knowledge of all relevant psychiatric characteristics, it
is clearly possible, even after these correlations were conceptually equated,
that some persons would be found neither criminally responsible nor civilly
committable. Therefore, the society of model III, to achieve isolation and
possible cure of such persons, might reasonably enact a mandatory commitment
statute under which a person who received a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity would automatically be committed to a mental hospital for treatment.
Such a statute, to be effective, would necessarily establish standards for release
which were higher than the standard for civil commitment, else a person
mandatorily committed might immediately be released.
In model III the operation of such a mandatory commitment statute
would present the following questions:
1) Can the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity constitutionally
justify mandatory commitment as defined above, and (assuming an affirma-
tive answer),
2) Can such mandatory commitment constitutionally be continued beyond
the period of the sentence which could have been imposed if the defendant
had been found guilty.
In model II, where the presence of mental disease was positively determin-
able, the only jury question in any criminal trial would be: did the defendant
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commit the act alleged? In "such a society, the degree to which a given illegal
act was correlated with the defendant's relevant characteristics could be known
with certainty; and the moral decision concerning the degree of correlation
necessary for exculpation would presumably be made by the legislature. Thus,
in a case where the correlation warranted exculpation, the jury would be
instructed that if the defendant did not commit the act alleged, they must
find him not guilty; and if the defendant did commit the act alleged, they must
find him not guilty by reason of insanity. The certain presence of a given
correlation coupled with the legislative determination that such a correlation
exculpates, would, in model II, preclude a verdict of guilty.
In model III, however, the degree to which a given illegal act was correlated
with the defendant's relevant characteristics could only be approximated; in
such a society the legislature would probably not attempt to define exculpabil-
ity in terms of a stated correlation; more likely it would state a rule in general
terms, placing the ultimate decision concerning criminal responsibility in
the bands of the jury.
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in model III represents a
determination that an illegal act was committed, and that the correlation
between the illegal act and defendant's relevant characteristics may have been
high enough to exculpate him. Assuming traditional burdens of proof such
a verdict does not represent a determination that the correlation between the
illegal act and defendant's relevant characteristics was, in fact, high enough to
exculpate him.' 5 Moreover society itself has postulated that the degree of
correlation which would be necessary to make such a determination could
never be established with certainty. Consequently, a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity does not exclude the possibility that the correlation was
low enough so that, if its true level could have been known, society would
have held defendant criminally responsible.
Because the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is ambivalent, the
application of more stringent release criteria in mandatory as opposed to
civil commitment appears justified. If defendant's correlation were such that,
if society could know it, he would have been held criminally responsible (i.e.,
the jury "erred"), then, undoubtedly, confinement for a reasonable period,
whether in a hospital or a prison, would be justified. If, on the other hand,
defendant's correlation were such that, if society could know it, he would have
been held irresponsible (i.e. the jury did not "err"), his releasability should
not be determined only by the reduction of his correlation below the level
required for initiating civil commitment; the effect of early release upon
defendant's free choice to recommit the act should also be considered since
model III has postulated that any act may be partially attributable to the
15. The District of Columbia courts, for example, require the prosecutor to rebut,
beyond reasonable doubt, the proposition that but for the defendant's mental disease the
illegal act would not have occurred. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616-17
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
19611 1363
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
exercise of free choice and that fear of punishment deters free agents from
choosing to commit an illegal act. Release, as in model II, should therefore be
ordered only if defendant's overall propensity to recommit the act-the extent
of his free choice plus the likelihood that he will freely choose to recommit the
act-falls-below the level required for civil commitment.
Once the period of a reasonable sentence has ended, however, the application
of these more stringent release criteria is no longer justified. Mandatory
confinement as the result of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was
justified only because even if the jury "erred" (i.e. if defendant's correlation
were such that, if society could know it, he would have been held criminally
responsible) the defendant could not be heard to complain about hospitalization
for a period equal to the prison sentence he should have received if the jury
had not erred. But once that period is over, if the jury erred (as society
postulates it may frequently do), there is absolutely no justification for con-
tinuing to confine the defendant as the result of his illegal act. If he is to be
confined it must be because he is now civilly committable. At the expiration
of a reasonable sentence, therefore, the criteria for release must be reduced to
the level required for civil commitment at least in those cases in which society
can not be reasonably certain that the defendant was irresponsible. Society's
refusal, at the expiration of the period of a reasonable sentence, to release a
non-committable defendant who, had his correlation been known, would have
been held criminally responsible would violate due process as clearly as the
refusal of a warden to release a prisoner at the expiration of his prescribed
sentence.
The criminal process, however, has made no effort to separate those whose
correlation justified a finding of responsibility, from those whose correlation
did not since it set out only to determine who might have had, not who did
have, a high enough correlation to warrant a finding of irresponsibility. And,
even if the criminal process did seek to make this determination, it would be
severely hampered since the society of model III has postulated that not all
relevant psychiatric characteristics, and therefore not all correlations, are
knowable; due process therefore requires that the release criteria be lowered for
all. Moreover, even if the defendant were correctly held criminally irresponsible,
society should assume that at the expiration of a reasonable sentence the
likelihood that he will exercise whatever free choice he has so as to recommit
an illegal act has been effectively negated by the rehabilitative effect of the
sentence. Society should therefore be concerned only with the non-free choice
elements of his behavior-the correlation between relevant characteristics and
illegal acts. And civil commitment release standards (which depend solely on
correlations), not mandatory commitment release standards (which depend on
overall propensity), should therefore be employed after the reasonable period
of a sentence.
In order to comply with this requirement courts in the model III would have
to impose a "quasi" sentence representing the period of imprisonment which
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would have been imposed 16 had criminal responsibility been found;17 the
court would thereby designate the day on which mandatory commitment re-
lease criteria would give way to civil standards for each defendant who re-
ceived a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Frederick Lynch did not receive a "quasi" sentence. On the contrary, the
Court of Appeals, which upheld the constitutionality of his confinement,
explicitly refused to assess a sentence on the ground that the length of hospi-
talization must depend solely on cure, and that any consideration of criminal
penalties was therefore irrelevant.' 8 Such reasoning is, of course, eminently
justified in a society with the characteristics of model I. But since the society
in which Frederick Lynch lives embodies generally the characteristics of model
III, the continued application of the more stringent mandatory commitment
release criteria beyond the period of the sentence that Lynch would have
received had he been found guilty of violating the bad check law cannot be
justified. In view of the disparities between the model in terms of which the
court wrote its decision, and the society in which he lives, it is presumably
scant consolation to Frederick Lynch that the road to St. Elizabeths, like that
other famous thoroughfare, is paved with good intentions.
16. For a variety of reasons including the possibilities of suspended sentence, judicial
discretion to impose less than maximum sentences, and reduction of the period of con-
finement as a result of good behavior during imprisonment, maximum sentences do not
accurately reflect the period of confinement generally imposed on a criminally responsible
person. Consequently, a procedure by which criteria for release reduced to civil standards
on expiration of the maximum sentence rather than on expiration of a reasonable sentence
might violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection, by systematically depriving
some who should have been held criminally responsible, of the'opportunity to be released
before the term of a maximum sentence had expired. In instances where a statute imposing
a high maximum sentence is generally not enforced, confinement until expiration of the
maximum sentence might even constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
1.7. In order to impose a quasi-sentence, the judge would have to know what crime
defendant had been found not guilty of by reason of insanity. Presently, when the jury may
find more than one possible crime (e.g., lesser included offenses) a general verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity does not reveal which of the crimes the jury found would have
been committed but for the absence of criminal responsibility. A special verdict would
reveal this fact. Of course, imposing a "quasi" sentence would involve all the problems
involved in sentencing generally, where judges do not usually articulate the principles
which guide them, in exercising their discretion. See generally Comment, 69 YALE L.J.
1453 (1960). But see United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ili. 1960).
18. Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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